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I. Introduction
Everyone seems concerned about government surveillance, yet
we have a hard time agreeing when and why it is a problem and
what we should do about it. When is surveillance in public
unjustified? Does metadata raise privacy concerns? Should
encrypted devices have a backdoor for law enforcement officials?
Despite increased attention, surveillance jurisprudence and theory
still struggle for coherence.1 Different kinds of surveillance are
often not grouped together as part of the same problem, like facial
recognition technologies and portals for viewing ISP records.
 Associate Professor, Samford University’s Cumberland School of Law,
Affiliate Scholar, The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School.
 Professor of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology. The authors
wish to thank Julie Brill, Danielle Citron, Patrick Gamez, Melinda Gromely, Don
Howard, Mark McKenna, and Neil Richards. The authors would also like to thank
Lydia Wimberly and Megan Fitzpatrick for their research assistance.
1. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
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Proposed remedies also vary according to who is the watcher, the
thing being surveilled, and the regulatory system in place to
monitor the surveillance. In short, a common thread for modern
surveillance problems has been difficult to find.
At the heart of the surveillance debate are contested uses of
technology that continuously and indiscriminately collect, use, and
analyze information that people choose to share with others, such
as automatic license plate readers that track all vehicles, software
that scrapes and analyzes the social web, and drones that can
effortlessly track multiple targets in public for long durations.2 In
these cases, questions arise as to whether privacy violations occur
when technology makes formerly manpower-intensive legitimized
surveillance cheap and easy—ostensibly too easy.
Yet, despite the widespread concern and extensive academic
treatment of surveillance issues, the language and framing used in
surveillance debate is diverse, inconsistent, and over-generalized.3
When people try to identify what it means to live in a surveillance
society, they usually say something like: “There is more data than
ever before and it is increasingly easier for the government to
access this data and understand what it means.”
Theorists have responded in numerous ways, giving
surveillance extensive academic attention. The literature links
surveillance to issues of autonomy, trust, power, dignity, respect,
identity, anonymity, disparate impact, and exploitation, among
others.4 Scholars have proposed theories based on property,
intellectual privacy, quantitative privacy, and others to help
understand why and how surveillance is dangerous.5 Reform
efforts have focused on pragmatism, bright-line time restrictions,
curtilage, trespass, and a host of other strategies.6
In particular, concepts like the “plain view” and “third party”
doctrines, which enable surveillance of things and activities
2. See infra notes 9–11 (listing modern surveillance technologies).
3. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (collecting cases and
discussing variance in judicial opinions regarding surveillance).
4. See infra notes 34–44 and accompanying text (summarizing academic
discussion on surveillance).
5. See infra notes 138–141 (discussing the impact of surveillance on
intellectual property).
6. See infra notes 34–44 and accompanying text (summarizing academic
discussion on surveillance).
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exposed or shared with others, conflict with modern notions of
privacy. Most people bristle at the idea that there is absolutely “no
privacy in public.” Critics have assailed the notion of
indiscriminate public surveillance. Yet, other than the stilldeveloping “mosaic theory,” which recognizes the revelatory power
of aggregated surveillance, little headway has been made
regarding reform for many modern forms of government
surveillance.7
Ideas about preventing the surveillance society from going too
far usually focus on three desirable outcomes: (1) prevent certain
groups from ever having access to certain types of information;
(2) prevent certain groups from being able to use certain types of
information in select contexts or in certain ways; and (3) make it
harder for certain groups to be able to access or interpret
information.
Government surveillance debates primarily revolve around
the third strategy—making government surveillance hard but
possible. Government surveillance concerns are rarely about
prohibiting the government from ever being able to access any
particular information, save issues like professional confidences,
evidentiary privileges, and rights to resist self-incrimination. Nor
are government surveillance concerns primarily about preventing
the government from discriminating against us on the basis of
information it should not be allowed to use, unless there is debate
about what data should be considered fair game for consideration
when creating things like the no-fly list.
Instead, the main source of anxiety about government
surveillance is about how easy it is for the government to access
our information: how readily government agents can access our
phones, our e-mail, our information stored in the cloud, our metadata, our geo-location data, and the like. Big concerns also exist
about how easily the government can combine readily accessible
data to form revealing profiles.
We think the government’s relative difficulty in finding
information is central to advancing the debate over government
surveillance. In this Article we argue that the concept of
“obscurity,” which deals with the transaction costs involved in
7. See infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (explaining the mosaic
theory).
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finding or understanding information, is the key to understanding
and uniting modern debates about government surveillance.8
Obscurity can do several things for privacy theorists and policymakers in the debate over government surveillance.
First, obscurity can explain why making surveillance hard but
possible is the central issue in the government surveillance
debates. Second, obscurity can be used to help identify different
areas where transactions costs for surveillance are operative and
explain why they are central components of the debate. Third,
obscurity can explain why the solutions to the government
surveillance problem revolve around a common dynamic:
introducing more transaction costs through friction and
inefficiency into process, whether it be legally through procedural
requirements like warrants or technologies like robust encryption.
Ultimately, obscurity can provide a clearer picture of why and
when government surveillance is troubling. Appeals to obscurity
can also cultivate an appreciation for why and how transaction
costs might be introduced into domains that have until now been
regulated by policies like the third-party doctrine.
Although these might seem like overly ambitious outcomes for
applying a novel and fundamentally descriptive concept, the way
we frame problems can affect how they are structured and
resolved. Obscurity is a desirable locus for reform efforts because
the concept translates well across different prescriptive
surveillance theories. In part, this is because normative
dimensions of surveillance theory have advanced more quickly
than the vocabulary that is needed to identify when surveillance
practices endanger values that the normative theories justify as
being important to protect.
A benefit of obscurity discourse having widespread theoretical
applicability is that it can further diverse reform goals. By
agreeing on a common descriptive theory of surveillance, reform
advocates have a common thread for reform efforts. Academics can
use obscurity to support normative surveillance theories. For
example, obscurity can enhance the quality of arguments for rights
of “intellectual privacy” and “quantitative privacy.”

8. See infra Part III (defining and discussing obscurity in the context of
surveillance).
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This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, we describe the
failure of the law to form a consistent, holistic response to
surveillance. We demonstrate that while justices, advocates,
policy-makers, and citizens intuitively understand surveillance
problems, they often struggle to articulate how or why such
surveillance is problematic. This inability to clearly describe the
problem and find coherence among the diverse theories of
surveillance has hindered consensus for reform.
In Part III, we introduce the concept of obscurity and explain
the important role that transaction costs for finding and
understanding information have played in shaping our societal
notions about privacy. We demonstrate that while the logic of
obscurity preservation has been articulated in a number of judicial
opinions regarding government surveillance, progress requires a
more explicit adoption of the framing. In Part IV, we argue that
obscurity should be the center of gravity for modern surveillance
theory. As a descriptive concept, obscurity can explain when and
how government surveillance is problematic. It provides a common
thread for disparate surveillance theories. Finally, obscurity can
be used to direct surveillance reform.
II. Surveillance and Theory: Many Concerns, Little Consensus, No
Locus
Every week there is seemingly a new story concerning a
troubling new surveillance practice or technology. Beyond the
Snowden disclosures, the past few years have seen widespread use
of cellphone-tower-mimicking technologies like the Stingray that
allows police to intercept phone conversations,9 expansion of the
FBI’s next generation facial-recognition technology system,10
9. See John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA
TODAY (June 13, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08
/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-police/3902809 (last visited June 12, 2015) (“Armed
with new technologies, including mobile devices that tap into cellphone data in
real time, dozens of local and state police agencies are capturing information
about thousands of cellphone users at a time, whether they are targets of an
investigation or not . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Rishi Iyengar, New FBI Software Can Process up to 52 Million Facial
Images, TIME (Sept. 17, 2014), http://time.com/3389559/fbi-facial-recognitionsoftware-interstate-photo-system-ips-next-generation-identification-ngi
(last
visited June 12, 2015) (“A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the
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license plate readers that allow both police and private parties to
keep tabs on vehicles’ whereabouts,11 and drones are enabling
more persistent and elusive public and private sector
surveillance.12 These stories raise a general anxiety over a
surveillance nation, yet they are different enough not to be grouped
together both in terms of why they are problematic, as well as what
to do about them.
Facial-recognition technologies are often seen as problematic
because it is impractical to hide your face when in public or change
it as a surveillance countermeasure. Biometrics create a new class
of “searchable” information. License plate readers, which simply
record the location of a vehicle on a public road, create a different
problem. Discussions surrounding license plate readers almost
exclusively focus on the aggregated nature of such information.
While observation of a single car’s license plate is seen as freely
permissible, effortlessly recording hundreds of thousands of such
observations and discerning patterns over time create a separate
problem.

foundation in April revealed that the system could process up to 52 million facial
images, including millions of pictures taken for noncriminal purposes.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779
(last visited June 12, 2015) (“The Justice Department has been building a
national database to track in real time the movement of vehicles around the U.S.,
a secret domestic intelligence-gathering program that scans and stores hundreds
of millions of records about motorists, according to current and former officials
and government documents.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Tom Loftus, Concerns Rise About Growing Use of Domestic Drones,
USA
TODAY
(July
18,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
2013/07/18/drone-concerns-rules-regulations/2552999 (last visited June 12, 2015)
(“[G]overnment agencies and universities can apply to the FAA for a certificate of
authority to fly a drone—large or small. Commercial drone usage is prohibited
now but is expected to take off after September 2015, a deadline Congress gave
the FAA to create a plan to integrate unmanned aircraft into the airspace.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Dan Roberts, FBI Admits
to Using Surveillance Drones over US Soil, THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/19/fbi-drones-domestic-surveillance
(last visited June 12, 2015) (“However, the potential for growing drone use either
in the US, or involving US citizens abroad, is an increasingly charged issue in
Congress, and the FBI acknowledged there may need to be legal restrictions
placed on their use to protect privacy.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Still different is drone surveillance, which is often categorized
as a “peeping tom” problem.13 Drones provide access to information
that would have been unable or unlikely to be viewed by the naked
eye before. Yet concerns about peeping drones are still different
than debates surrounding cleavage, upskirt, and “creeper” photos
in public. Here, the concern is not aggregation or newly enabled
access to private spaces, but rather the fixation of a moment
otherwise destined to be fleeting and forgotten. Unlike license
plate readers, even one such instance can be problematic, even
though people exposed themselves to the public. Yet, unlike
peeping drones, cleavage and upskirt photos are often taken in
public spaces.
Thus, modern surveillance can be problematic because it
involves secrets, fleeting public exposure, aggregated information,
and unchangeable biological identifiers. This is to say nothing of
the traditionally problematic surveillance issues involving the
interception or requisition of communications and stored
information.
It is thus no surprise that it has been difficult to find a common
center of gravity for surveillance policy and discourse. Focusing on
aggregated information excludes consideration of single-instance
surveillance. Focusing on the interception of communications can
overshadow concerns about biometrics and genetic data. The lack
of commonality among the many different issues has resulted in
inconsistent and confusing policy, as well as discrete and diverse
reform attempts.
For example, the law of public surveillance is increasingly a
mess. Courts and policy-makers regularly affirm that there is no
“privacy in public.”14 Entire concepts like the “public view” doctrine
13. See Mary-Ann Russon, Are Flying Drones a Peeping Tom’s Dream Tool?,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 11, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/are-flying-dronespeeping-toms-dream-tool-1452278 (last visited June 12, 2015) (“Fears are
growing that helicopter drones could be used to sexually harass women and take
secret photographs of them.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See, e.g., Chadwell v. Brewer, 59 F. Supp. 3d 756, 763 (W.D. Va. 2014)
(discussing a public school teacher’s expectation of privacy in an office he shared
with another teacher); Order to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements at 3,
United States v. Cleveland, No. 18 DVM 1341 (Sup. Ct. D.C. Sept. 4, 2014),
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/Cleveland%20motion%20to%20sup
press%20order.pdf (“This court finds that no individual clothed and positioned in
such a manner in a public area in broad daylight in the presence of countless
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and “third party” doctrine enable this truth in surveillance law.15
The concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is the critical
and central concept that determines the scope of a number of
different critical privacy protections.16 It governs the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections, as well as the torts of intrusion
upon seclusion and the public disclosure of private facts, Fourth
Amendment,17 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).18 Courts and lawmakers have consistently established
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public
information.19
In the landmark case Katz v. United States,20 Justice Stewart
wrote that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”21 Yet the Justice then went on to muddy the
other individuals could have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
15. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 563 (2009) (“[A] person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in information disclosed to a third party.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 317 (2012) (“[C]onduct
does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy when it consists of observing
the outside of property, observing what has already been exposed to the public, or
observing public spaces where anyone may travel.”).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the role of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the fourth amendment context); see also
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1512
(2010) (“U.S. Supreme Court decisions applying the reasonable expectation of
privacy test have been attacked as ‘unstable’ and ‘illogical,’ and even as
engendering ‘pandemonium.’”).
17. See e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (“[T]he
‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party . . . , even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
18. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2012).
19. See McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437–38 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(“Invasion of privacy consists of the public disclosure of private facts about the
plaintiff . . . . The defendant must intentionally reveal facts which are of no
legitimate public interest, as there is no right of privacy in public matters.”
(emphasis added)); State v. Frost, 634 N.E.2d 272, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“The
young ladies had no right of privacy at a public beach, and they probably expected
to be observed in their bikini bathing suits.”).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)).
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conceptual waters by stating in the next sentence: “But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.”22 Katz extended the
pronounced trend of courts to bluntly exclaim that there can be no
privacy in publicly shared information, yet completely failed to
conceptualize public information. Commenting on the trend
exacerbated by Katz, Brian Serr wrote:
[T]he Court has made little effort to refine [the reasonable
expectation of privacy] test; instead, the Court has focused
primarily on the ‘knowingly exposes to the public’ language that
the Katz majority used. Regrettably, the Court has severed that
language from its context and used it as a talisman, ruling that
any objects, statements, or activities exposed to the public—
even if exposed only to a very limited degree—do not deserve
fourth amendment protection.23

In California v. Ciraolo,24 the Supreme Court wrote:
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been
extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the
mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict
some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations
from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and
which renders the activities clearly visible.25

The Court noted that because aircraft could reasonably be
expected to fly over one’s house at any time, “it is unreasonable for
respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye
from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”26 The Court observed that “[t]he
Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in
the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to
observe what is visible to the naked eye.”27

22. Id.
23. Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 597–98 (1989).
24. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
25. Id. at 213.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 215.
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In United States v. Knotts,28 the Supreme Court similarly held
that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”29 The Court reasoned that
walking down the street voluntarily conveys to “anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads
in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and
the fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads
onto private property.”30
But this line of reasoning is problematic. Consider the
confusion the “no privacy in public” assertion causes within the
tort of public disclosure of private facts.31 Courts often look to the
location of where information is disclosed, yet there is no set
definition for the term “public.”32 Public roads are obviously public,
but what about indoor shopping malls? Offices in buildings? When
are structures with four walls and a roof “public?”
Academic and societal criticism has also failed to converge
around a common discourse or set of principles for critique and
reform. While such different theories and approaches are useful,
the lack of common ground means that possibly related topics are
spoken of in different ways and treated differently in law and
policy.
For example, scholars and the general public have revolted at
the idea that there is no privacy in public and that the law should
support such a notion.33 But the logic of such criticism and
proposed reform is diverse. For example, Andrew Guthrie
28. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
29. Id. at 281–82.
30. Id.
31. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 347 (1983) (citing
numerous court decisions stating “that information individuals reveal about
themselves in public places is by definition not private”).
32. See id. (demonstrating the difficulty of distinguishing public places from
private places).
33. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
125, 169 (2002) (“Privacy, when defined as the boundary-maintenance necessary
to individual and group definition, recognizes . . . that the ‘private’ can happen in
‘public.’ We do not shed all privacy expectations simply because we walk on a
public street, or enter a classroom, or attend a ball game.”).
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Ferguson has proposed looking to the curtilage concept to resolve
problematic questions of public surveillance.34 According to
Ferguson, “the theory of personal curtilage turns on persons being
able to control the constitutionally protected areas of their lives in
public by signifying that they intend for an area to be secure from
physical and sense-enhancing invasion.”35 This account of
surveillance focuses on concepts like property and control.36
For Helen Nissenbaum, public surveillance is all about
context. Nissenbaum has theorized that privacy violations occur
when “context-relative informational norms” are not respected
when sharing information.37 In proposing a theory of privacy as
contextual integrity, Nissenbaum has proposed that “when
violations of norms are widespread and systematic as in public
surveillance, when strong incentives of self-interest are behind
these violations, when the parties involved are of radically unequal
power and wealth, then the violations take on political significance
and call for political response.”38
In addressing the notion of privacy in public, Joel Reidenbuerg
has proposed:
[T]he transformation of information flows through three stages
of development, which fundamentally undermines the concept
of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’ Information that was
once private through obscurity now becomes technologically
accessible. Information that was once merely accessible now
becomes transparent and receives wide publicity. These
34. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth
Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2014) (“This
Article applies the theory of Fourth Amendment curtilage to persons acting in
public.”). According to Ferguson, “[c]urtilage has long been understood as a legal
fiction that expands the protection of the home beyond the formal structures of
the house. Curtilage recognizes a buffer zone beyond the four walls of the home
that deserves protection even in areas observable to the public.” Id.
35. Id. at 1287–88.
36. See id. (“Based on custom and law protecting against both nosy neighbors
and the government, courts defined curtilage by the actions the property owner
took to signal a protected space.”).
37. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010) (stating that the
framework of contextual integrity provides that “finely calibrated systems of
social norms, or rules, govern the flow of personal information in distinct social
contexts (e.g., education, health care, and politics)”).
38. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV.
119, 156 (2004).
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parameter changes no longer fit within traditional court
jurisprudence on privacy.”39

According to Reidenberg, “constitutional democracy depends
on spheres of privacy in public to preserve public safety and fair
governance.”40 To create those spheres of privacy in public,
Reidenberg proposed that “privacy protection be framed in terms
of ‘governance-related’ and ‘nongovernance-related’ acts.”41 Thus,
Reidenberg’s account of surveillance is dependent upon the nature
of the acts being surveilled.
Chris Slobogin has framed the issue of privacy in public as one
of anonymity.42 In a different article, Slobogin proposes a solution
to the problem of aggregated pieces of surveillance based upon the
proportionality principle, “the idea that the justification for a
search should be roughly proportional to the intrusiveness of the
search” and “John Hart Ely’s political process theory.”43 According
to Slobogin, “as applied to searches, this theory counsels that
courts should generally defer to legislation authorizing searches of
groups when the affected groups have meaningful access to the
legislative process and the search is implemented in an evenhanded fashion.”44
39. Joel R. Reidenburg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 143
(2014).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002) (“The Fourth
Amendment should be construed to recognize the right to public anonymity as a
part of the privacy expectations that, to use the Supreme Court’s well-known
phrase, ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”).
43. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2012).
44. Id. Slobogin proposes specific language for the codification as follows:
(a) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 48 hours in
aggregate requires probable cause, and a warrant unless exigent
circumstances exist.
(b) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 20 minutes in
aggregate but no longer than 48 hours in aggregate requires
reasonable suspicion, and a court order unless exigent circumstances
exist.
(c) A targeted public search that does not last longer than 20 minutes
in aggregate may occur at a law enforcement officer’s discretion
whenever the officer believes in good faith that the search can
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Jeffrey Skopek also couches the surveillance debate and
proposed resolutions in terms of anonymity. Skopek argued that
the failure of the law to protect privacy in public is the result of
confusion between anonymity and privacy.45 These scholars are
just a few of the many voices in surveillance law, policy, and theory
with diverse views on when and why surveillance is a problem and
what we should do about it.
But this diversity makes it hard for courts and lawmakers to
create coherent surveillance jurisprudence. Often, they must
adhere to one account or another. A common ground for the modern
surveillance debate would be useful. But first we must talk about
“privacy” in a different way. Instead of focusing on traditional
notions of “private” and “public,” we propose that the concept of
obscurity, which deals with the difficulty and probability of
discovering or understanding information, is more effective than
traditional frames for the surveillance debate. Obscurity sits along
a continuum. Appeals to the concept can mitigate the atomistic
nature of modern surveillance policy and discourse and can help
resolve our tendency to fall back into the public privacy divide.
III. An Obscurity Primer
In this Part, we develop our theory of surveillance as loss of
obscurity. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word
“obscurity” has been in circulation for quite some time.46 Its
original meaning, the “quality or condition of not being clearly
known or understood,” dates back to 1474, and by 1495 it also

accomplish a legitimate law enforcement objective.
Id. at 24.
45. See Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2523393&download=yes (“The problem with the public exposure and
third party doctrines is not only that they fail to recognize that a piece of personal
information can be protected in varying degrees . . . . In addition, and more
fundamentally, they conflate two distinct forms that this protection can take:
privacy and anonymity.”).
46. See OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004) (defining “obscurity”),
available at www.oed.com/view/Entry/129848?redirectedFrom=obscurity#eid34
119781.
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meant “a wholly or partially unintelligible expression.”47 In the
early part of the 16th century, when Gavin Douglas famously
translated Virgil’s The Aeneid, obscurity became associated with
“uncertainty of meaning.”48 And while members of our
contemporary fame-obsessed society use obscurity to refer to “the
quality or condition of being unknown” and an “unknown person”
or “unknown thing,” their etymologies respectively begin in 1578
and 1822.49
The law, however, has its own specialized lexicon for obscurity.
The canonical starting point for explicit debate about “practical
obscurity” in the American judicial system is the 1989 ruling of
U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press.50 There the Supreme Court recognized a privacy interest
in information that is publicly available, but nevertheless difficult
to obtain.51
Specifically, the Court determined that the Freedom of
Information Act requirements do not compel the federal
government to use its criminal records database to expedite access
to rap sheets so that inquirers are spared effort and expense;
justice is not violated if they have to seek out the information from
inconveniently located places, such as courthouses’ files.52 In
delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens writes:
In sum, the fact that ‘an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not
mean that an individual has no interests in limiting disclosure
or dissemination of the information’ . . . the substantial
character of that interest is affected by the fact that in today's
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). In the domain of cybersecurity, obscurity has a
technical meaning as well. There it involves “hiding information”: concealing
vulnerabilities, so that others cannot take advantage of those weaknesses, and
“deliberately suppressing general information about a system to make things
more difficult for adversaries, hackers, and third parties to discover flaws in a
system.” EDWARD AMOROSO, CYBER ATTACKS: PROTECTING NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE 171 (2012).
51. See United States v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 750 (1989)
(recognizing a strong privacy interest in maintaining the “practical obscurity” of
a rap sheet).
52. See id. (“[T]he privacy interest in maintaining the rap sheet's ‘practical
obscurity’ is always at its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure
is at its nadir.”).
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society the computer can accumulate and store information that
would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person
attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.53

Unfortunately, Reporters Committee turned out to be, thus far, the
legal apex for obscurity argumentation.54 In subsequent years,
there has been only intermittent case law acknowledgement that
the logic underlying the decision is valid and has broader
applicability.55
For example, although the term “obscurity” is not used in the
Supreme Court of New York case Bursac v. Suozzi,56 the ruling
does cite privacy interests acknowledged in Reporters Committee.57
In this instance, the court determined that while DWI arrests are
a matter of public record, Nassau County Executive Thomas
Suozzi went too far in creating an online “Wall of Shame,”
containing mugshots and names of people who were arrested in his
country for the offense.58
According to Judge William R. LaMarca:
It is the scope and permanency of public disclosure on the
Internet by a governmental agency that distinguishes the
County’s “Wall of Shame” from traditional and regular forms of
reporting and publication such as print media. The County
Executive's campaign of publicizing DWI arrests serves a
legitimate purpose but the use of specific identifying
information on the Internet, with its endless implications, is of
concern to the court.59

Simply put, because publishing DWI arrests online can lead to
“limitless and eternal notoriety, without any controls,” the court
53. Id. at 770.
54. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2012) (discussing the reluctance of courts to
expand upon the “practical obscurity” concept articulated in Reporters
Committee).
55. See id. at 21–22 (“Beyond a general sense that shared or available
information does not always constitute public information, courts have had a
difficult time expanding on the concept.”).
56. 868 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
57. See id. at 479 (“The Internet has no sunset and postings on it will last
and be available until some person purges the Web site, perhaps in decades to
come.”).
58. Id. at 473–74.
59. Id. at 480.
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concluded that the risk is too great that unfair harms will come to
those listed on the digital wall.60 Beyond undermining the
constitutionally protected due process that should be afforded to
those profiled (by presenting potential members of a jury with
incriminating portraits), the information too easily induces bias
and can tempt potential employers and landlords to abuse their
power in perpetuity.61
With cases like these in mind, we have proposed our own
definition of obscurity that is privacy-oriented: “Obscurity is the
idea that when information is hard to obtain or understand, it is,
to some degree, safe.”62 Obscurity considerations can play a role in
protecting all forms of communication, and “online obscurity”
exists when at least one of the four “key factors” is missing that
play a crucial role in discovering or comprehending information:
“(1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and
(4) clarity.”63 Because there are many ways to manipulate these
factors, different strategies can make online disclosures more
obscure. For example:
[S]haring ideas on platforms that are invisible to search
engines; using privacy settings and other access controls;
withholding your real name and speaking anonymously or
identifying yourself with a pseudonym; disclosing information
in coded ways that only a limited audience will grasp; or
transmitting content that is encrypted or temporarily accessible
through an ephemeral conduit, like Snapchat, the photo

60. Id. at 481.
61. See id. at 480 (“It is the scope and permanence of public disclosure on the
Internet by a government agency that distinguishes the County’s ‘Wall of Shame’
from traditional and regular forms of reporting and publication such as print
media.”).
62. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think
About Your Data Than “Privacy,” THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-wayto-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/ (last visited June 12, 2015) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Evan Selinger & Woodrow
Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in ROUTELEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
TECHNOLOGY (Joseph Pitt & Ashley Shew eds., 2014), (“Obscurity is the idea that
information is safe—at least to some degree—when it is hard to obtain or
understand.”).
63. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 54, at 2.
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messaging application that can delete information within
seconds after the recipient views it.64

While anyone can use these strategies and related ones,
discrete individual action is not the only scale for adding obscurity
to the online information ecology. Consider the recent policy debate
over Europe’s so-called “right to be forgotten” and America’s socalled “erasure” laws.65 We believe that some of the discussions
have gotten derailed when partisans insist that the ability to
delete links to information stored on Google or to remove
information minors previously posted on websites is tantamount
to historical revisionism—a prohibition that prevents others from
noticing that someone once wrote something or had something
written about him or her.
To correct these exaggerated interpretations, we have argued
the endeavors should be fundamentally construed as obscuritypromoting initiatives that make it hard (or harder), but not
impossible, to discover irrelevant, inadequate, and embarrassing
details.66 After all, in the former case, original source material is
64. Selinger & Hartzog, supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, A Stronger Online Eraser Law Would Be a
Mistake, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg
22029420.200-a-stronger-online-eraser-law-would-be-a-mistake.html#.VQyHa47
F_E8 (last visited June 12, 2015) (“So I firmly believe the goal of erasing
unremarkable self-disclosures is more palatable than the broad ‘right to be
forgotten’ proposals by the EU and France. California's effort is closer to a ‘right
to hide.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eric Posner, We All
Have a Right To Be Forgotten, SLATE (May 14, 2014), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/the_european_r
ight_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html (last visited June
12, 2015) (“It’s not a right to be purged from the memory of people who know you,
but rather to control how information about you appears online.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to
“Forget”, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?_r=2 (last visited June 12, 2015)
(arguing the Europe’s “right to be forgotten” is both too broad in that it “allows
individuals to impede access to facts about themselves found in public documents”
and too narrow in that it “doesn’t require that unwanted information be removed
from the web”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 62 (“Safety, here, doesn’t mean
inaccessible. Competent and determined data hunters armed with the right tools
can always find a way to get it. Less committed folks, however, experience great
effort as a deterrent.”); Selinger & Hartzog, supra note 62 (“When information is
hard to come by, the only people who will seize upon it are those with sufficient
motivation to expend the necessary effort and resources.”).
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left intact, while the latter instance does not obliterate third party
re-posts.67 Although appeals to authority have questionable
evidentiary weight, it is still worth noting that Federal Trade
Commissioner Julie Brill has used similar framing.68
At its core, our account of obscurity is predicated upon a causal
view of human behavior: people are routinely deterred from
pursuing goals that require expending effort or assets when they
lack the requisite motivation or resources. The main causal claim
at the heart of obscurity theory, therefore, is that when
information is difficult to acquire or burdensome to interpret, the
only people who will be inclined to do the detective work are those
who deem the expense an acceptable cost.
Because many factors can go into determining when a person
judges the expense of obscurity-minimizing measures as
reasonable to incur, calculations about who will be thwarted by
obscurity-enhancing techniques are always probabilistic in nature.
Creating restraints by adding transaction costs can never provide
the peace of mind offered by absolute safeguards that guarantee
competent and determined parties—including busybodies,
enemies, aggrieved members of a community, hackers, and
government agencies—are definitively unable to obtain or
decipher disclosures we wish to selectively share. But then again,
it is doubtful that such foolproof safeguards actually exist. As Paul
Ohm rightly notes, “No technology is perfect, and advocates who

67. See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Google Can’t Forget You, But It
Should Make You Hard to Find, WIRED (May 20, 2014), http://www.wired.
com/2014/05/google-cant-forget-you-but-it-should-make-you-hard-to-find/
(last
visited June 13, 2015) (“This debate is not and should not be about forgetting or
disappearing in the traditional sense. Instead, let’s recognize that the talk about
forgetting and disappearing is really concern about the concept of obscurity in the
protection of our personal information.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
68. See JULIE BRILL, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF OMNISCIENCE: APPROACHES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 2 (2014) (“Here, we can all agree that as the Age of
Omniscience descends upon us, we can and will find ways to protect individual
privacy.”); see also Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Why You Have the Right
to
Obscurity,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Apr.
15,
2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0415/Why-youhave-the-right-to-obscurity (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (interviewing
Commissioner Brill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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comment on privacy and technology in truth almost never advocate
for perfect privacy . . . .”69
Research across the disciplines, both old and new, supports
our causal intuitions. Modern scholarship critiques the recent
obsession over “frictionless sharing” via social media.70 But as far
back as antiquity, people testified that expediency is a seductive
temptation. Take Plato’s famous discussion of the story Gyges in
The Republic (360 B.C.E.), a parable that is presented so we can
consider why a mythical shepherd behaved badly by using a ring
of invisibility to effortlessly kill a king and seduce his wife, the
queen.71 Plato was not simply articulating why moral deliberation
is required to reject egoism and the realist doctrine that justice is
the advantage of the stronger. He also was identifying frictionless
experience as a corruptive force.72
Contemporary discussion about the ethics of using consumer
technology often revolves around concern about diminished effort
diminishing our experiences. For example, Albert Borgmann, a
preeminent philosopher of technology, argues that the prevalence
of cheap consumer devices designed to disburden us from hard
work by providing safe, easy, and instantaneous opportunities for
satisfaction significantly impedes our desire to develop the type of
robust character needed to pursue a truly meaningful life: the
availability of fast food and microwave dinners disinclines families
from preparing meals from scratch; and the ease of being
entertained by televisual media incentivizes us to avoid more
taxing activities, like reading.73 In the same spirit, one of us has
69. Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2008).
70. See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689,
713 (2013) (“There are just three problems with making frictionless sharing of
reader records our default: Frictionless sharing isn’t frictionless, it isn’t really
sharing, and it’s corrosive of intellectual privacy and intellectual freedom.”);
William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 15–17 (2013)
(“[T]he word ‘friction’ has another meaning: it describes the forces that impede
individuals from disclosing personal information when they use online
services. . . . [M]any implementations of frictionless architecture have gone too
far, potentially invading privacy and drowning useful information in a tide of
meaningless spam.”).
71. See JOHN KAAG & SARAH KREPS, DRONE WARFARE 110 (2014) (recounting
the story of Gyges).
72. See id. at 109–10 (“Even when it is incredibly easy, expediency is not
necessarily a virtue.”).
73. See generally ALBERT BORGMANN, TECHNOLOGY AND CHARACTER OF
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argued that technological norms that demonize inefficient
communication undermine the care and respect that etiquette is
meant to inspire, and automated forms of communication that
appreciably lessen thought and intentionality can diminish both
autonomy and conscientiousness.74
The ethical stakes of altering effort are not limited to the
effects of using commodities. They also extend to a vast range of
policy issues. For example, in their account of “nudging,”
behavioral economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass
Sunstein argue that because humans are prone to being influenced
by the cognitive bias of inertia, it is incumbent upon designers to
help us avoid doing self-sabotaging things by creating sticky
defaults that capitalize on our laziness.75
For example, providing small plates in cafeterias will make it
easier for people to avoid overeating because many will not bother
to wait in line for seconds. Retirement plans that automatically
enroll employees will minimize the regret that people come to
experience after realizing that being deterred by having to fill out
an opt-in form and submitting it to human resources and resulting
in them being financially unprepared to retire. Requiring driver’s
license applicants to decide whether or not to be organ donors will

CONTEMPORARY LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1984) (arguing that overreliance
on technology leads to a life dominated by effortless and thoughtless
consumption).
74. See Evan Selinger, We’re Turning Digital Natives into Etiquette
Sociopaths, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/digitalnatives-etiquette-be-damned/ (last visited June 13, 2015) (“[W]hile living
according to the gospel of technological efficiency and frictionless sharing is fine
as a Silicon Valley innovation ethos, it makes for a downright depressing social
ethic.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Evan Selinger, Will
Autocomplete Make You Too Predictable?, BBC FUTURE (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150115-is-autocorrect-making-you-boring
(last visited June 13, 2015) (“[B]y encouraging us not to think too deeply about
our words, predictive technology may subtly change how we interact with one
another. As communication becomes less of an intentional act, we give others
more algorithm and less of ourselves.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
75. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (offering
advice on preventing common mistakes based on research from fields of
behavioral science and economics).
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help them more readily actualize their altruistic intentions than if
they faced opt-in schemes.76
And in their attempt to move debates about warfare beyond
the concerns typically expressed over international law and local
political processes, philosopher John Kaag and political scientist
Sarah Kreps insist that drone strikes can minimize so many
expenses for the United States—not just economic costs, but also
in terms of potentially saving many soldiers’ lives—that the
country is at risk of embracing a moral hazard whereby the
problem of “dirty hands” gets magnified, while citizens are
shielded from its reality and consequences.77
One of the most important things to keep in mind when seeing
situations as calling for obscurity-enhancing strategies is that
obscurity is not an all-or-nothing state of affairs. Rather, obscure
statements exist on a nuanced continuum of disclosure wherein we
enter into public and semi-public settings, but aim to limit our
communication to select audiences. Because these are instances
where we volunteer thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, pursuing
obscurity clearly cannot be the same thing as aiming for total
secrecy.
And yet, at the same time, when obscurity considerations are
in play we are not inviting everyone in the world to know our
business, nor are we demonstrating allegiance to the ideal of a
totally transparent life. Hence, one of us has argued that
“[o]bscurity explains why we are comfortable talking about
personal information in a crowded restaurant and posting personal
information to a restricted number of people within online
communities.”78 Indeed, “[a] significant portion of our everyday
interaction places us into a zone of obscurity, where our identity
76. One of us has contested Thaler and Sunstein’s approach to organ
donation. See generally Kyle Powys Whyte, Evan Selinger, Arthur L. Caplan &
Jathan Sadowski, Nudge, Nudge or Shove, Shove—the Right Way for Nudges to
Increase the Supply of Donated Cadaver Organs, 12:2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32 (2012)
(arguing that Thaler and Sunstein’s approach fails to appreciate how perceptions
of meaning can influence people’s responses to nudges).
77. See KAAG & KREPS, supra note 72, at 109–10 (“[B]ut the story also
suggests that it is difficult to blame a person whom you can’t see, and even harder
to bring them to justice. In these disturbing cases, a wicked act can go
unexamined and therefore unpunished.”).
78. Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021,
1038 (2013).
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and personal context are unknown to those we interact with or
share common space.”79 Socialization typically depends on some
ability to manage the accessibility and comprehension of social
exchanges by outsiders, the loss of which can be quite harmful.80
Obscurity is not a contemporary phenomenon. Indeed, social
norms have historically developed around it. Jim Harper correctly
notes:
Practical obscurity has long ensured that even nonprivate
information is not widely shared. An endless array of social,
legal, and economic practices has developed around the
assumption that the information collected about people will
remain practically obscure. The things we wear, the places we
go, the people we see, the things we say, and the things we buy
have all been chosen in the best under the umbrella of practical
obscurity.81

While Harper makes descriptive observations about what has been
the case, Harry Surden has gone a step further and argued that
the practical limitations that make obscurity possible—including
the “latent structural constraints” of transaction costs—have
historically created a psychological sense that citizens are
protected by “structural rights.”82
79. Id. Consider how many unidentified people interact with each other in
restaurants, office buildings, public transportation, and the like.
80. See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
(1975) (analyzing the concepts of privacy, crowding, territory, and personal space,
with regard to human behavior); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (studying human behavior in social situations and the way
we appear to others); ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS (1966) (discussing social psychology
research in social settings); SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY:
DIALECTICS OF DISCOURSE (2002) (offering a practical theory for why people make
decisions about revealing and concealing private information); Erving Goffman,
Felicity’s Condition, 89 AM. J. SOC. 1, 51 (1983) (reviewing work in
sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and conversational analysis in the sociological study
of social interaction); Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the Most Personal Secrets Get
Outed
on
Facebook,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
13,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044416580457800874057820022
4.html (last visited June 12, 2015) (describing the harmful effects of inadvertently
disclosing information known only to a small group on the social network site
Facebook) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. JIM HARPER, IDENTITY CRISIS: HOW IDENTIFICATION IS OVERUSED AND
MISUNDERSTOOD 162 (2006).
82. See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605,
1607 (2007) (“In the privacy context, society implicitly relies upon non-legal
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This special class of rights is a matter of legally codified,
positive entitlements. Instead, structural rights are pervasive
social expectations about how information can be accessed,
interpreted, and shared. The crucial thing, Surden insists, is that
when structural rights are sufficiently strong and reliably present,
they can contribute to a climate where it seems unnecessary for
society to take further legal steps to protect our interests.83
Consequently, lawmakers need to avoid succumbing to the
reductionist temptation of believing that all of the protections
citizens expect to be in place have been formally assigned legal
rights.
Given the nuance and historical depth of obscurity, appeals to
the concept can shed new light on a range of privacy debates that
have been theoretically limited by seemingly intractable binary
terms. In normative discourse, as well as privacy law and policy,
there is a tendency to consider information as either public or
private.84 “This maligned on/off approach to privacy has been
called the ‘public-private dichotomy’ or ‘secrecy paradigm.’”85
Daniel Solove describes the secrecy paradigm as an
understanding of privacy based on concealment preventing others
from invading one’s hidden world.86 Under this conception,
disclosed information is no longer concealed and thus, no longer
private. Sharon Sandeen notes that this “vision of privacy makes
it difficult for individuals to protect personal information once it
has been shared with others.”87 Solove argued that the secrecy

regulators to prevent a large number of unwanted behaviors.”).
83. See id. at 1609 (“To the extent that society depends upon the presence of
these costs to reliably inhibit a potential privacy-violating activity, their
dissipation results in a sudden regulatory shift, leaving these interests
unprotected.”).
84. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 54, at 17 (“[M]any conflicts seem to
stem from one problem—individuals have complex notions of privacy in regard to
personal information but the law tends to treat that information only two ways:
public or private.”).
85. Id.
86. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 42 (2004) (“Privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded
by watching and by public disclosure of confidential information.”).
87. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn
from Trade Secret Law, 6 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 694 (2006).
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paradigm “fails to recognize that individuals want to keep things
private from some people but not others.”88
Disclosing information to some, but not all, is a difficult task.
Solove asserts that not all private activities are pure secrets
in the sense that they occur in isolation and in hidden corners.
When we talk in a restaurant, we do not expect to be listened
to. A person may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medication in a
store open to the public, but certainly expects these purchases
to be private activities.89

Solove holds that, contrary to the notion that information in
public records cannot be private, “there is a considerable loss of
privacy by plucking inaccessible facts buried in some obscure
[public] document and broadcasting them to the world on the
evening news. Privacy can be infringed even if no secrets are
revealed and even if nobody is watching us.”90
It is worth asking whether complete secrecy is even possible
in a networked world. Solove posits that life in the information age
“often involves exchanging information with third parties, such as
phone companies, Internet service providers, cable companies,
merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as
total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in
today’s world.”91
Other scholars have advocated similar obscurity-related
pursuits. For example, Rebecca Green expressed concern that
digital-age citizens who sign petitions and contribute to political
causes by donating small amounts of money are at heightened risk
of having undesired parties monitor their views.92 While those of
us who are comfortable proclaiming our political beliefs to anyone
who will listen will not be deterred by this possibility, others who
prefer to be discrete may become less willing to participate in basic

88. SOLOVE, supra note 86, at 44.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1152
(2002).
92. See Rebecca Green, Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP.
L. REV. 367, 367 (2013) (“But if political privacy does matter, if the reaction to
amplified exposure in petition signing does dissuade people from signing
petitions, a basic part of our political process will be threatened.”).
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political processes—especially when troubling outcomes can arise
if the wrong crowd gets wind of where our sympathies lie.93
As Green points out, groups who are opposed to certain ideas
or outcomes can target supporters for harassment.94 Among other
things, politically motivated groups can circulate lists that reveal
who signed petitions alongside other publically available
information, such as the signatories’ addresses, phone numbers,
and even links to online maps that give directions to their homes.95
Ultimately, Green contends that if we reach undesirable levels
of concern, society will need to acknowledge that a threat to
“political privacy” has arisen from lost “political obscurity.” On a
descriptive level, she defines the term as follows:
Political obscurity refers to the state of one’s political
preferences being shrouded or otherwise difficult to discern or
distinguish by others. A person enjoys political obscurity when
she can go about her day as she so chooses without others
perceiving or otherwise determining the nature of her political
views. The politically obscure person is able to control and
manage the extent of disassociation from the political views she
holds (or once held) or political actions taken in the present and
in the past.96

Prescriptively, then, if political obscurity were viewed as a right, it
would be understood as “the fundamental right to exist without
one’s political preferences being continuously recorded.”97
At the other end of the spectrum, there is skepticism about the
possibility of preventing the death of obscurity, as well as concern
that proposals for protecting obscurity are misguided. Some insist
that technological development makes appeals to obscurity
antiquated. Anita Allen writes:
The Reporter’s Committee case . . . is also significant today as a
kind of swan song, maybe a dirge. Thanks to electronic records,
93. See id. at 386 (“Growing empirical evidence suggests that waning
political obscurity threatens petitioning.”).
94. See, e.g., id. (“The plaintiffs feared this targeted Internet dissemination
would effectively become a blueprint for harassment and discrimination.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. See id. at 400 (describing the ability of political organizers to purchase
targeted lists of likely petition signers).
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id.
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the Internet and search engines, the vaunted “practical
obscurity” of data is soon to be a memory. Data once resigned to
the dustbin of history is now at anyone’s fingertips . . . . Bad
behavior today, or unwise or inadvertent disclosures, are not
forgotten; they will never become practically obscure.98

Others acknowledge that the concept of “obscurity” adds
nuance to the privacy lexicon but doubt its legal relevance. Brian
Wassom claims, “It is difficult to envision how obscurity could be
lawfully enforced in a legal framework that forbids government
restrictions on speech.”99
Others still explicitly reject appeals to obscurity to justify the
law-restricting endeavors for collecting and reporting truthful
disclosures “to prevent a perceived, potential harm to someone’s
privacy interests.”100 In this context, it has been asserted that
obscurity claims depart too strongly from established precedent,
including the third-party doctrine, the logic underlying the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the privacy of the home in its
discussions of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, and the
Supreme Court’s rejection of privacy interests existing for things
done in “plain view” or “open fields.”101 It has also been argued that
obscurity claims suffer from the twin maladies of overstating
harms and understating the value of transparency.102
There also are issue-specific rejections of proposals that are
grounded in obscurity ideals. For example, it has been argued that
98.
99.

ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 162 (2011).
BRIAN WASSOM, AUGMENTED REALITY LAW, PRIVACY, AND ETHICS: LAW,
SOCIETY, AND EMERGING AR TECHNOLOGIES 46 (2014).
100. Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic
Defense of No Privacy in Public, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 549 (2011);
see also Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How
Obscurity-Based Privacy and a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible with Free
Speech, 18 COMM. L. & POL'Y 91, 119–20 (2013) (“The concept of a privacy interest
arising out of the obscurity of information . . . [is] fundamentally at odds with the
established theories that undergird the American First Amendment right of
freedom of speech.”).
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (presenting doctrinal
arguments against calls for a right to obscurity).
102. See Anderson, supra note 100, at 550 (“[T]hese scholars’ demand for a
right to obscurity is misplaced because they (i) overstate the potential harms
linked to more technologically-advanced and democratized exposure, and (ii)
inadequately account for the many benefits of exposure that would be blocked
should their quest for a tight to obscurity succeed.”).
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the Supreme Court reached the wrong decision in Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting Company.103 That case
concerned a California statute that prevented people from
receiving access to government records of arrestees if they were
going to use the information for commercial purposes like selling
products or services.104 The supposed problem with this decision is
that the discrimination imposes “unwarranted” expense on the
barred groups, risks creating a false sense of security that a
privacy problem has been solved, and erroneously crafts policy
based on the form information is stored in, rather than the “nature
of the information” itself.105
Yet despite such criticism, we propose that obscurity can be
the key to unifying the diaspora of modern surveillance theory and
policy because of its utility and broad applicability due to its
fundamental reliance on transaction costs and probabilities. As we
discuss below, it is easier to explain why certain surveillance is
problematic when surveillance is understood as loss of obscurity.
A focus on obscurity can accommodate multiple interests in
reforming surveillance law, making consensus more likely.
IV. Obscurity Should Be at the Center of the Government
Surveillance Debate
Diverse theories inform how the law regulates surveillance
and how scholars determine which ideals and principles should
guide surveillance law reform. Key components of leading theories
can be rephrased into obscurity terms. We believe that talking
about surveillance as a loss of obscurity can render both policy and
contemporary conversation about surveillance less fragmented. By
outlining a conceptual center of gravity that underlies and
connects different surveillance theories, we aim to create a new
103. 528 U.S. 32 (1999); see also ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PRIVACY AND THE
DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 60 (2002)
(“Imposing additional expense on particular businesses to acquire the same
information that is available to other parties, like journalists or advocacy groups,
seems unwarranted.”).
104. United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 34–36.
105. See RAUL, supra note 103, at 60 (“Moreover, differential denial of public
access to public information may lull government agencies into believing they
have solved a problem.”).
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and useful vantage point for assessing how far surveillance creep
extends and determining how best to address the expansion.106 In
this Part, we will use Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and Neil
Richard’s theory of intellectual privacy as exemplars of how
embracing obscurity can improve the state of surveillance law and
theory, respectively.
A. Obscurity and the Fourth Amendment
Although the Fourth Amendment is the locus classicus of
juridical approaches to surveillance, debate rages over
unanswered questions and conflicting interpretations.107
According to Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, there are structural
reasons why discord has come to plague views about protections
and permissions: tension exists between principles articulated
before the digital age began and the new opportunities for
surveillance that innovation has made possible; a patchwork
approach to resolving cases has resulted in “doctrinal gaps,” rather
than a unified paradigm of surveillance theory; the guiding
analytic concepts, including “probable cause” and “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” are overdetermined and require inherently
contestable judgment to operationalize; and dispute exists over
what basic value (or values) the Fourth Amendment is supposed to
safeguard.108
106. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the link between surveillance theory and
obscurity).
107. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment
Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1305–06 (2014) (“Scholars have
debated the textual meaning of its clauses as well as the core purpose of the
Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
108. See id.
[T]he method of surveillance should be irrelevant, and the results of
the surveillance are all that should matter in determining whether an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed.
Thus, in applying the Katz test, courts should look only to the
characteristics of the item or information being observed—its location,
its nature, and/or the actions taken by the defendant to conceal it.
(citing Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo, A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1321–
22 (2002)); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727,
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732 (1993) (discussing the intrusiveness theory); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not
Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1998) (claiming that the Terry principle needs to be
rejuvenated because later case law is too vague); Christopher Slobogin, The World
Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (providing an
overview of how searches and seizures should be handled without the Fourth
Amendment); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1511, 1511 (2010) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment should provide protection whenever
a problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular form of
government information gathering.”); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011)
When changing technology or social practice makes evidence
substantially harder for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court
generally adopts lower Fourth Amendment protections for these new
circumstances to help restore the status quo ante level of government
power. On the other hand, when changing technology or social practice
makes evidence substantially easier for the government to obtain, the
Supreme Court often embraces higher protections to help restore the
prior level of privacy protection.
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 322–23 (2002)
Official exploitation of a scientific or technological device should be
considered a Fourth Amendment search at least when the effect is to
enhance, augment or supplement human sensory abilities or other
capacities in ways that have made it possible for the authorities to gain
access to any information that otherwise would have been, or is highly
likely to have been, imperceptible or inaccessible or would only have
been, or is highly likely only to have been, perceived or acquired by
means that are governed by the Fourth Amendment.
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002)
Continuous, repeated or recorded government surveillance of our
innocent public activities that are not meant for public consumption is
neither expected nor to be condoned, for it ignores the fundamental fact
that we express private thoughts through conduct as well as through
words. The Fourth Amendment should be construed to recognize the
right to public anonymity as a part of the privacy expectations that, to
use the Supreme Court’s well-known phrase, “society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.”
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“The
Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy.”); Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a
New Framework, Replacing the Right to Privacy, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 20
(2007)
For example, were “search” defined as a violation of intrinsic human
dignity, it is likely the Court would recognize aerial surveillance into
one's backyard, without warrant, as a violation of the home dweller’s
dignity. Stop and frisk, based on less than probable cause, would
similarly violate reasonable standards of dignity. And, for the motorist,
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Perhaps the most important recent case to cause controversy
over how to interpret the Fourth Amendment is United States v.
Jones.109 There, the Justices unanimously ruled that police
performed a constitutionally prohibited search when, one day after
their warrant expired, they installed a GPS device to a car’s
undercarriage that suspected narcotics dealer Antoine Jones drove
with the intent of keeping tabs on his activity.110 For twenty-eight
days, the government unrelentingly tracked and recorded where
the vehicle went, amassing over 2,000 pages of location data.111
The majority opinion focused on the act of physical intrusion
that had transpired.112 But concurring opinions from Justices
Sotomayor and Alito clarified why this narrow approach leaves
deep problems on the horizon.113 Eighteenth-century trespass law
rooted in property-rights theory might suffice to resolve the matter
whose car might in fact be his or her most cherished place, arbitrary
police intrusion might preclude much that happens today, since under
present law, if one steps into his or her car, he or she surrenders the
“right to be let alone.”
Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 169
(2002)
Privacy is, however, more a matter of affect than cognition. Privacy is
a set of metaphorical boundaries that enables each of us to safeguard
a sense of self. Privacy enables us to decide which aspects of ourselves
to reveal and to whom. That control matters deeply, because overly
selective exposure of ourselves to others will lead to their misjudging
our nature.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 98 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core interests
essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom of
movement.”); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1775
(1994) (claiming that government surveillance has reduced “the right to be left
alone”).
109. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011).
110. See id. at 948 (explaining that the government used the tracking device
for twenty-eight days).
111. See id. (charging the defendant based on the information obtained from
the tracking device).
112. See id. at 949–52 (explaining that the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test did not replace the Fourth Amendment trespassory test).
113. See id. at 954–64 (“[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices . . . .”).
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at hand, given the contingent circumstances involved, but it is
inadequate for resolving the broader twenty-first century privacy
problems that occur when the use of powerful and ubiquitous
surveillance technologies clash with the privacy interests people
often claim to have while being in public.114 Simply put, while the
Court ruled that Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated,
it did not clarify whether warrantless surveillance that yields the
type of scrutiny Jones was subjected to—consider, for example, the
possibility of the government monitoring smart phone GPS
coordinates—should be deemed unreasonable, in principle, under
the Fourth Amendment.115
While Justices Alito and Sotomayor did not explicitly adopt
obscurity terminology, their remarks clearly convey appreciation
for the logic of obscurity theory. Indeed, they essentially frame
lingering privacy concerns as obscurity issues, and in so doing hint
at the radical possibility that the Fourth Amendment stands to
lose much of its social value if its interpretation fails to better
address the problems that obscurity theory renders salient.
Justice Sotomayor stated that “it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.”116 She further maintained that she “would not assume
that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.”117 We see this as a clear appeal to
consider additional constitutional protections for obscurity
interests—to acknowledge that when citizens communicate with
select audiences, it may still be reasonable for them to expect
protections from forms of surveillance that bring heightened
publicity to their disclosures.
Justice Sotomayor suggests that such protections are
especially relevant to consider in cases where the government
114. See id. at 956 (“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”).
115. See id. at 955 (explaining that physical intrusion is no longer necessary
for surveillance in many instances).
116. See id. at 956–57 (noting that the premise “is ill suited to the digital
age”).
117. See id. at 957 (emphasizing that she believes telling a third party
information for a limited use does not erase the person’s expectation of privacy).
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easily can use efficient aggregation technology to transform
otherwise discrete and comparatively obscure forms of information
into integrated portraits that are conveniently available in a single
location. Clear pictures of patterned behavior impinge on privacy
interests because they can reveal intimate dispositions and
preferences. Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor writes:
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements. I
would ask whether people reasonably expect that their
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. 118

Justice Alito’s remarks about long-term surveillance
undermining privacy protections echo two of the views that we
highlighted in Part III of this Article: Harper’s historical sense of
how privacy expectations developed alongside the practical limits
that transaction costs impose and Surden’s view of structural
rights.119 Regarding Harper’s concerns of practical limitations,
Justice Alito contends that “[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest
protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory,
but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of
time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.”120
Regarding Surden’s theory of structural protections, he claims that
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period.”121
Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito espouse ideas
associated with what many have referred to as the “mosaic theory”
of surveillance, which came to prominence in the case United
States v. Maynard.122 Orin Kerr has summarized the theory as
requiring “courts to apply the Fourth Amendment search doctrine
to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in isolated
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
See supra Part III (providing background on the obscurity theory).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2011).
See id. at 964 (highlighting the practical implications of the holding).
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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steps.”123 Kerr clarifies that “[i]nstead of asking if a particular act
is a search, the mosaic theory asks whether a series of acts that
are not searches in isolation amount to searches when conducted
in a group.”124 A hypothetical application of mosaic theory,
therefore, would be allowing government agents to engage in
warrantless GPS tracking for a delimited period of time, but
insisting that they obtain a warrant to continue on past this point.
Kerr
acknowledges
that
legitimate
concerns
for
“equilibrium-adjustment” motivate mosaic theory.125 But he
squarely recommends that the courts reject the mosaic theory,
which he categorized as a “major departure” from traditional,
sequential interpretations of what constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.126 According to Kerr, if the courts were to
make the mistake of adopting mosaic theory, they would need to
solve highly complex and overly burdensome puzzles, such as
setting appropriate standards for determining when a mosaic is
completed and determining which approaches to data aggregation
fall under the mosaic purview.127
Kerr is a leading critic of mosaic theory, but not everyone
shares his pessimism about the costs of embracing it.128 After all,
if technology can eviscerate obscurity, perhaps it also can be used
as a tool to pinpoint when too much obscurity evisceration takes
place. In this spirit, Steven Bellovin, Renée Hutchins, Tony
Jebara, and Sebastian Zimmeck have contended that advances in
the computer-science approach to machine learning make it
possible in some domains to determine when an agreed upon
123. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 (2012) [hereinafter Mosaic Theory] (meaning that together
the events can constitute a search even if the individual steps do not).
124. See id. (explaining the mechanics of the mosaic theory).
125. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479–82 (2012) (elaborating more fully on
what equilibrium-adjustment is and why he believes it should be defended).
126. See Mosaic Theory, supra note 123, at 314–15 (highlighting how the
mosaic theory is disjointed from traditional case law).
127. See id. at 314 (emphasizing the practical concerns associated with the
mosaic theory).
128. See, e.g., Steven Bellovin, Renée Hutchins, Tony Jebara & Sebastian
Zimmeck, When Enough is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and
Machine Learning, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 556, 556–628 (2014) (supporting the
mosaic theory).
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threshold of overly invasive search has been breached.129 Under
current algorithmic constraints, they argue that an approximate
tipping point can be specified for going too far for warrantless geolocation tracking.130 The demarcation, they speculate, is exceeding
a week.131
Jones is just one example of how obscurity is already
embedded as a concept in surveillance law, yet courts have not
adequately conceptualized it. This leads to splintered theories
regarding theories of duration, information sensitivity, and
trespass with no real locus for moving forward. By focusing on
obscurity and transaction costs, courts would be able to isolate the
operative factors concerning when an expectation of privacy is
reasonable and a search is thus unreasonable.
B. Obscurity and Surveillance Theory
In addition to courts and policy-makers, surveillance theorists
can also benefit from appeals to obscurity. To say that something
is obscure is to describe it. As a descriptive concept, obscurity can
be utilized by other theories of surveillance to explain when and
why surveillance is problematic. In this way, obscurity can serve
as a common thread for surveillance theorists. In this Part, we will
demonstrate how the language of obscurity can supplement
privacy theory by exploring, among other theories, the intersection
between obscurity and the concept of “intellectual privacy” that
Neil Richards developed.132
Richards draws the line against government and corporate
surveillance when agents, agencies, and corporations intrude too
deeply upon “intellectual privacy”—the right for citizens in a free
society to be granted a great deal of latitude to learn and express
themselves without experiencing the behavior-altering chill that

129. See id. (focusing on the importance of the use of technological advances
on the benefits of the mosaic theory).
130. See id. (providing an example of how the technology could be utilized).
131. See id. at 625 (explaining the use of data sets in more detail).
132. See generally NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015) (discussing the complexities of corporate and
government surveillance and the freedom of speech).
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comes from suspecting intimate, belief-forming, and belief-sharing
activities are being monitored, such as reading and debating.133
A pressing challenge for intellectual privacy is the diminishing
obscurity of public activity. Although public places are readily
associated with heightened expectations of visibility, the fact
remains that people engage with controversial ideas that expand
their political and moral imaginations in public places all the time
because they anticipate that what they say and do will only be
observed by limited, local audiences.134 In other words, people
routinely speak their minds publicly without presupposing that
they are entering into full-blown public debate.135 They even view
exchanges occurring in public as preparatory work for acquiring
the psychological confidence and justificatory arguments needed to
subsequently offer interesting remarks for more of the general
public to consider. These behaviors and attitudes exist because
free-flowing social interaction is a crucial component of developing
and maintaining a mature and responsible consciousness.
There is ample evidence that Richards’s view of intellectual
privacy is widely maintained, even though the average person does
not use such technical vocabulary to describe why it is possible to
leave the house without becoming paranoid. For example, when
people dine at restaurants, they are willing to engage in passionate
arguments about contentious subjects rather than fearfully
sticking to bland topics, like the weather. Folks are also
comfortable marching in parades for social causes they are
committed to, but do not necessarily want everyone who knows
them to be aware of the cause they support. People are often even
okay consuming media about unpopular and risqué topics while
travelling on public transportation and sitting at cafes. But these
attitudes can change. Surveillance technologies that dramatically
minimize the transaction costs required for others to record and
share information featuring or about us performing these and
related activities can undermine our willingness to pursue them.
According to Richards, such a blow to what we call obscurity would
be potent enough to damage the fabric of democracy.136
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id. at 5 (emphasizing the problems of intellectual privacy).
Id. at 157.
Id.
See id. at 3 (“[W]e need to be clearer by what we mean by both ‘privacy’
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Another reason that the right to intellectual privacy is
important in the digital age is that so much of what we disclose
and peruse occurs over media connected to the Internet. Richards
and others thus express concern over technologies that promote socalled “frictionless” modes of social reading that minimize the
control we can exert over what companies and other people know
about our literary habits.137 “Under current law,” Richards writes,
the electronic commerce company Amazon.com “is free to sell all of
its sensitive data however it wants to.”138 This discretionary
latitude is disconcerting because, by default, Amazon’s popular
e-reader, the Kindle, “keeps detailed records of what we buy,
browse, how long our mouse rests over a word and our eyes linger
over a page, what pages we underline and what the most
underlined pages are, whether we finish a book, whether we
re-read a book, and what passages we re-read.”139 By emphasizing
technologically induced, diminished transaction costs, Richards
again effectively identifies decreased obscurity as the root of
problematic surveillance.140
Obscurity problems are also related to Richards’s worries that
government surveillance is endangering intellectual privacy.141
Consider, for example, his stance on the encryption debate that
was going strong during the fall of 2014 and which persisted well
and ‘speech.’ We need to think more deeply about the complexity of these two
values, what they mean, what they do for us, and the surprising, mutually
reinforcing relationships between them.”)
137. See Neil Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 690–
724 (2013) (warning about the information individuals give to corporations and
their loss of control over the information); William McGeveran, The Law of
Friction, U. CHI. L. REV. 15, 15 (2013) (noting that frictionless sharing discloses
individual’s data immediately).
138. See Evan Selinger, What Is Intellectual Property, and How Yours Is Being
Violated, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.
com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0225/What-is-intellectual-privacyand-how-yours-is-being-violated (last visited June 18, 2015) (claiming that there
are real political ramifications stemming from our intellectual data) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. See id. (focusing on the fact that librarians have ethical confidentiality
obligations, but corporations like Kindle do not).
140. See id. (acknowledging that one avenue this problem shows up in is
internet advertising).
141. See id. (explaining that intellectual privacy affects everyone—not just
the scholars).
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into the following year.142 Companies like Apple offered consumers
products with strong encryption: the iOS 8 operating system, for
example, provides encryption by default, and this means that the
data stored on up-to-date iPhones cannot be accessed without
breaking this encryption—an act that requires using the owner’s
password or key.143 Security experts like Kevin Poulsen depicted
manufacturing and distributing these products as gestures that
distance Silicon Valley companies from being branded as “NSA
collaborators.”144 But President Obama was so dismayed over the
absence of backdoors that he decried designs that lock out
government agents.145
Richards is not persuaded by the logic of the President’s
opposition.146 Appealing to intellectual privacy, Richards states,
“Encryption provides necessary safeguards by securing what we’re
thinking until we’re ready to enter public debate.”147 When pressed
further about why due process does not assuage his worries about
how the government will use backdoors, Richards justifies his
position by stating that civil rights are protected when transaction
costs prevent the government from conducting over-zealous
142. See Editorial Board, Compromise Needed on Smart Phone Encryption,
WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compromiseneeded-on-smartphone-encryption/2014/10/03/96680bf8-4a77-11e4-891d-713f052086
a0_story.html (last visited June 18, 2015) (analyzing the link between technology,
legal, and privacy concerns) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. See id. (explaining that the encryption is so strong Apple cannot even
break it for law enforcement).
144. See Kevin Poulsen, Apple’s iPhone Encryption is a Godsend, Even if Cops
Hate It, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:30 A.M.), http://www.wired.com/ 2014/10/goldenkey/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (explaining that several large corporations were
painted as “NSA Collaborators” by Edward Snowden) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. See id. (“With the release of iOS 8, Apple made a privacy improvement
so dramatic that it should rightly wipe out the taint of these security failures.
Instead, the company is bashed by the nation’s top law enforcement official and
the editorial board of one of the country’s most prestigious newspapers.”); see also
Danny Yadron, Obama Sides with Cameron in Encryption Fight, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
16, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/16/obama-sides-withcameron-in-encryption-fight/ (last visited June 18, 2015) (discussing President
Obama’s stance on spy access to encrypted cell phones) (on file with the
Washington and Lee School of Law).
146. See Selinger, supra note 138 (explaining the strength of encryption
compared to frictionless information sources).
147. Id.
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searches.148 Although, yet again, he does not make an explicit
appeal to obscurity, the proffered argument presupposes the
causal logic that lies at the heart of obscurity theory:
We know from Snowden and others that very often due process
in national security cases is minimal to non-existent, and better
checks need to be in place than the ones we currently have. Also,
encryption doesn’t mean that government can’t ever get access
to information, any more than putting locks on a door means
that nobody can break into a house. The government’s response
to this retort is that encryption makes it harder for law
enforcement to do its job. But that’s exactly the point of civil
liberties
like
intellectual
privacy.
They
introduce
inefficiencies.149

When Richards emphasizes that the government can still
access data that a citizen has stored on his or phone even without
a back door, he is referring to the range of legal options available.150
For example, if the government is looking for e-mail, it can
approach a service provider and follow the routes permitted under
the ECPA; depending on factors like date and whether an e-mail
has been opened, the possibilities range from obtaining a warrant,
obtaining a subpoena and sending out notification, or simply
obtaining a court order. Or, if the desired information is stored in
the cloud (for example, in places like Google Drive or Dropbox), the
government typically can get its way with only a court order. And
while consensus does not exist about whether a warrant is
sufficient to compel an individual to decrypt a device, that outcome
has arisen in cases like United States v. Fricosu151 and
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt.152
This is not the first time Richards has called for limiting
government surveillance by changing obscurity dynamics through
the introduction of practical inefficiencies.153 In 2013, he argued:
148. See id. at 717 (explaining that confidential rules should guide disclosures
of sensitive information).
149. Id.
150. See id. (noting also that backdoors make it easier for malicious hackers
to access as well).
151. 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012).
152. See 468 Mass. 512 (2014) (dealing with a forgery that involved
encryption).
153. See Neil Richards, Don’t Let U.S. Government Read Your E-mail, CNN
(Aug. 18, 2013 9:04 AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/18/opinion/richards-
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We should presume the privacy of e-mail and other
communications, and we should require the government to get
warrants supported by probable cause before it can read our
mail, track our movements and use our communications data to
construct a map of everyone we know and when we talk to
them.154

In this context, Richards laments that Lavabit and Silent Circle,
companies that provided encrypted and secure e-mail services,
were essentially forced to shut down due to government
pressure.155 Such disappointment can be described in obscurity
terms, as Stefanie Pell’s work demonstrates.156
When Pell discusses Silent Circle, she insists that the
technology and others like it can play a special role in our postUnited States v. Jones society.157 The essence of her argument is
that because it appears likely that time will need to pass before
legislation is created that is in line with the concurring opinions of
the Justices who are sympathetic to interpreting the Fourth
Amendment in terms that reflect the mosaic theory, the power of
code to function as what Lawrence Lessig calls a “regulator” should
not be underestimated.158 Accordingly, she writes:
While waiting for more definitive action from the courts and
Congress, such “privacy enhancing” anonymization and
encryption technologies can provide a temporary “fix” to the
problem of ever-expanding police powers in the digital age,
insofar as they make law enforcement investigations more
difficult and expensive, thereby forcing law enforcement to
prioritize some investigations and, perhaps, deemphasize or
drop others.159

lavabit-surveillance/ (last visited June 19, 2015) (emphasizing that
communication is at the heart of our political freedoms) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
154. Id.
155. See id. (explaining that the government was pressuring them to hand
over Edward Snowden’s records).
156. See generally Stefanie Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a
Technology Fix—Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 489 (2013).
157. See id. at 531 (explaining that Silent Circle is an encryption service
offering encrypted texts and phone calls).
158. See id. at 489 (providing an overview of her article).
159. Id.
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Obscurity can also aid theories that describe why dragnet
surveillance involving large quantities of information is
dangerous. Because most of our lives are lived in obscurity, the
specter of surveillance occurring “most of the time” threatens to
jeopardize this important default—a state of affairs that protects
people from having to scrutinize every move they make. In the big
data age, where digital dossiers containing massive amounts of
personal data are expanding at an alarming rate, an appeal to
obscurity can provide support for what David Gray and Danielle
Citron call a right to “quantitative privacy.”160
Gray and Citron begin their account of quantitative privacy by
looking to the concurrences in United States v. Jones.161 They note
that “[t]hose Justices insisted that citizens possess a Fourth
Amendment right to expect that certain quantities of information
about them will remain private, even if they have no such
expectations with respect to any of the discrete particulars of that
information.”162 Under this theory, “even if the use of a GPSenabled tracking device to effect ‘relatively short-term monitoring
of a person’s movements on public streets’ does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment, ‘the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.’”163
The scholars note this is a revolutionary theory with an
unclear fit in standard Fourth Amendment pedigree.164 According
to Gray and Citron, “[a] quantitative approach to the Fourth
Amendment appears to undercut well-established rules, including

160. See generally David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A
Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative Privacy (2012) [hereinafter
Quantitative Privacy], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id= 2129439; see also David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right
to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71 (2013) [hereinafter Right to
Quantitative Privacy] (discussing quantitative privacy and the mosaic theory’s
dominance).
161. See Quantitative Privacy, supra note 160, at 12 (discussing Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion).
162. See id. at 68 (highlighting the difference between short term and long
term surveillance).
163. Id.
164. See id. (claiming that it undercuts current doctrine, including third-party
rules).
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the public observation doctrine and the third-party doctrine.”165
They note the theory’s challenges, stating
Defenders of quantitative privacy must chart a conceptual link
to these precedents or provide compelling reasons for changing
course. Advocates also must provide a workable test that law
enforcement and courts can employ in drawing the line between
quantities of data that do and do not trigger the Fourth
Amendment.166

The scholars propose a theory to do just that, stating, “Rather
than asking how much information is gathered in a particular case,
we argue here that Fourth Amendment interests in quantitative
privacy demand that we focus on how information is gathered.”167
Gray and Citron argue that:
[T]he threshold Fourth Amendment question should be whether
a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and
indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable
expectations of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a
surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is
left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or
other government agents.168

Note that this theory is, at base, reliant upon the notion of
transaction costs for surveillance. High transaction costs for
surveillance eliminate the specter of a surveillance state because
it would be resource intensive. Gray and Citron explicitly recognize
this, stating that factors to consider when determining the capacity
for broad, indiscriminate surveillance include “(1) the inherent
scope of a technology’s surveillance capabilities, be they narrow or
broad; (2) the technology’s scale and scalability; and (3) the costs

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 71.
168. See id. at 71–72
If it does not, then the Fourth Amendment imposes no limitations on
law enforcement’s use of that technology, regardless of how much
information officers gather against a particular target in a particular
case. By contrast, if it does threaten reasonable expectations of
quantitative privacy, then the government’s use of that technology
amounts to a “search,” and must be subjected to the crucible of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness, including judicially enforced constraints
on law enforcement’s discretion.
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associated with deploying and using the technology.”169 Looking at
these factors,
[i]f a court finds that a challenged technology is capable of broad
and indiscriminate surveillance by its nature, or is sufficiently
inexpensive and scalable so as to present no practical barrier
against its broad and indiscriminate use, then granting law
enforcement unfettered access to that technology would violate
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy. 170

One way to articulate when the right to quantitative privacy
is threatened is when the obscurity is lost. When transaction costs
fall, large amounts of previously obscure information are
surveilled. Obscurity explains when and why quantitative privacy
is triggered. Bulk quantities of information are important to
protect, not because they are sensitive, but because people relied
upon the obscurity of this, and indeed most, information. Gray and
Citron even explicitly acknowledge the relationship between
practical obscurity and quantitative privacy when they discuss the
Reporter’s Committee opinion.171
According to the scholars that developed the theories,
quantitative privacy is distinct from intellectual privacy with
respect to surveillance. In a response to Neil Richards’s article The
Dangers of Surveillance,172 which articulated a theory of
intellectual privacy for surveillance, Gray and Citron argue,
“although Richards aptly captures the dangers to intellectual
freedom posed by technologically enhanced surveillance, we fear
his policy prescriptions are both too narrow and too broad because
they focus on ‘intellectual activities’ as a necessary trigger and
metric for judicial scrutiny of surveillance technologies.”173
According to Citron and Gray, “by focusing too much on what
information is gathered rather than how it is gathered, efforts to
169. See id. at 102 (highlighting the high transactions costs associated with
surveillance).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 113–14 (mentioning that the costs of mass surveillance has
been dramatically reduced).
172. Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 1934
(2013).
173. Danielle Citron and David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 266
(2013).
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protect reasonable expectations of privacy threatened by new and
developing surveillance technologies will disserve the legitimate
interests of both information aggregators and their subjects.”174
They continue, “One reason we are troubled by Richards’s
focus on ‘intellectual activities’ as the primary trigger for
regulating surveillance technology is that it dooms us to contests
over which kinds of conduct, experiences, and spaces implicate
intellectual engagement and which do not.”175 Gray and Citron
propose an alternative: “Rather than assigning primary
importance to ‘intellectual activities’ and presumably providing
less protection against the acknowledged perils of broader types of
surveillance, the law’s focus should be on the dangers of totalizing
surveillance.”176
The concept of obscurity is thus useful for narrowing the gap
between intellectual privacy and quantitative privacy theories. By
recognizing that remedies focusing on transaction costs and
preserving the obscurity of information can simultaneously foster
intellectual privacy and quantitative privacy, it becomes easier to
appreciate the common ground that Richards, Citron, and Gray
share.177 Not only can policy recommendations build upon this
commonality to create outcomes that both theories would validate
as just (albeit for different reasons), but it also becomes possible to
see how the type of machine-learning research championed by
Steven Bellovin, Renée Hutchins, Tony Jebara, and Sebastian
Zimmeck has the potential to advance outcomes prized by both
theories too.178 Quantitative insights can illuminate when
aggregation covers sufficient ground as to minimize the obscurity
necessary for maintaining intellectual privacy and avoiding the
threshold wherein indiscriminate surveillance occurs.

174. Id. at 267.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 270 (“The threat posed by contemporary surveillance
technologies lies in how much and how often people are watched.”).
177. See generally Richards, supra note 132; Quantitative Privacy, supra note
160.
178. See generally Bellovin, supra note 128.
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V. Conclusion

When government surveillance is understood as a series of
discrete problems that just happen to be occurring at the same
time, conceptual bias hinders surveillance reform: the right
approach for finding solutions appears to be proposing discrete
remedies. The patchwork approach to U.S. privacy law and judicial
concern about undue activist overreach entrenches this
propensity. The fragmentation of surveillance law further limits
many proposed surveillance protections to conservative gestures
based on doctrines whose applicability is increasingly challenged
by powerful and cheaply available technology that disrupts social
and institutional norms.
Once it is clear that a common theoretical center of gravity
underlies diverse surveillance problems and claims about why
surveillance creep needs to be reined in, it becomes less
challenging to imagine far-reaching and holistic approaches to
progress. In this Article, we have argued that framing surveillance
dilemmas as obscurity predicaments is a crucial step towards that
goal.
Applying obscurity theory’s two principle insights—the
behavior-altering power of transaction costs and sociological
explanation of why reasonable expectations for privacy can exist
for public disclosures—is the key for identifying significant,
common themes that have been communicated across forwardlooking surveillance literatures. The main conclusion that can be
drawn under a unified obscurity-based approach to surveillance is
that a democratically accountable government should find it
appropriately difficult to violate the privacy rights of its citizens.
Of course, determining what the threshold should be for
calibrating appropriate difficulty is a contentious normative
endeavor. No analyst can determine it solely by appealing to
obscurity theory; after all, the framework is inherently descriptive.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the
explanatory value of seeing undue expediency in obtaining or
interpreting information as the fundamental problem plaguing
government surveillance. Keeping this issue in mind when
analyzing the specifics involved with any particular surveillance
case makes it easier to appreciate why pervasive surveillance
anxiety exists, how that anxiety can magnify the practical stakes
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involved in a given instance, and why seemingly unrelated options
for further justice (ranging from requiring warrants to proposing
measures that make it harder to aggregate mosaics) actually
converge around a common objective: adding friction into a process
or system to make a person or piece of information harder to find
or understand, thus preserving obscurity.

